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Abstract 
This thesis examines how the dead bodies of the Romanovs and of Vladimir 
Lenin are used as political and cultural capital in attempts to legitimate and shape 
Russia’s post-Soviet government.  The first chapter shows how the reburial of the 
Romanovs invoked tsarist imagery as part of a larger series of invocations of the tsarist 
past by then-President Boris Yeltsin and other groups to build a new government.  
However, due to political tension and infighting the only group that benefited from the 
reburial of the Romanovs was the Russian Orthodox Church.  The second chapter 
explores how the embalmed body of Vladimir Lenin is problematic by being unburied 
and being a reminder of Soviet times.  Both of these chapter use newspaper articles, 
speeches, and interdisciplinary analysis of academic text to show how Boris Yeltsin, 
Vladimir Putin, and the Russian Orthodox Church built, or attempted to build, stability in 
post-Soviet Russia.    
This thesis shows that the dead bodies of Romanovs and Lenin have been used by 
people in power as a type of political currency, with varying degrees of success.  
Additionally, this thesis explores how these two sets of bodies demonstrate the 
importance of the past, both Tsarist and Soviet, in shaping Russia’s government.     
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1. Introduction  
Burials, reburials, and the treatment of dead bodies are clear political and cultural acts.  
They reflect ideas of self, nationhood, and the past in a way that is difficult to find in any 
other object or event.  This thesis will examine the fates of two sets of dead bodies in 
Russia; the bodies of the last Tsar, Nicholas II, and his family and the preserved remains 
of the former Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin.  These bodies are interesting sites of study 
not only due to their importance in Russian history but because they also represent the 
winning and losing side of the last regime change in Russia, and the only two types of 
political systems Russia previously had. This thesis will be interdisciplinary, reflecting 
the highly complex nature of dead bodies.  Due to their cultural, political, and personal 
value, dead bodies transcend history, politics, and human interaction.  They are objects 
that once were people: they as complex as people but they can be transformed into 
supporting any ideology, just like objects or ideas.   
Sociologist Graeme Gill states that bodies are important symbolically for four 
main reasons.  Firstly because they have a materiality or concreteness “they have a 
presence in popular consciousness that is more substantial than that of less clearly 
defined concepts like communism, democracy and capitalism…they cannot be either 
ignored or summarily dismissed on the basis of being purely intellectual constructs.”  
Secondly, dead bodies have an ambiguity of meaning; messages attached to dead bodies 
can appeal to many people on the basis that different people have different ideas of what 
the body represents.  Ambiguous meaning can come from the life of the person whose 
body it is, the way that that person died, or other things.  Different sorts of interpretations 
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of the life and death of the person whose body it is can create different types of meaning 
of the body.  Thirdly, the bodies of citizens can symbolize the essential continuity of 
community:  
The body and its burial can provide a sense of immortality, a statement that death 
does not involve separation from the community, while involvement in the ritual 
of a burial can strengthen the sense of collective integrity and solidarity among 
those that remain.  The living feel that their connection to the community 
mediated through those the honoured dead, while for the state the respectful 
treatment of the dead represents its commitment to the valorization of the 
community and its continuity.   
Fourthly, bodies remind people of the issues of birth, survival, and death.  As mentioned 
before, unlike other symbols dead bodies were once people and, therefore, there is a 
natural link between the symbol and the people now influenced by the body.  Gill closes 
by saying that “for these reasons, particularly the last, the symbolic significance of bodies 
may exceed in impact and importance the significance of most other non-corporeal 
symbols.”1  Anthropologist Katherine Verdery also focuses on dead bodies in her book 
The Political Lives of Dead Bodies.  She states that dead bodies: 
offer us some purchase on the cultural dimension, in the anthropological sense, of 
postsocialist politics…They help us to see political transformation as something 
more than a technical process…The ‘something more’ includes meanings, 
feelings, the sacred, ideas of morality, the nonrational--- all ingredients of 
‘legitimacy’ or ‘regime consolidation’…yet far broader than what analyses 
employing those terms usually provide.  Through dead bodies, I hope to show 
how we might think about politics, both as strategies and maneuvering and also as 
activity occurring within cultural systems.
2
 
Both of these quotations explore in great depth what makes dead bodies a unique way to 
examine the world; that is, dead bodies are uniquely able to express the less tangible and 
                                                 
1
 Graeme Gill, “‘Lenin Lives’: Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism,” Europe-Asia 
Studies 60, no. 2, 2008: 177-178. 
 
2
 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies : Reburial and Postsocialist Change (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 25. 
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recordable effects of regime change.  Not only do people feel connected to the dead but 
they can easily project their desires onto them.   
An exploration of dead bodies and the rhetoric that surrounds them is an 
invaluable way to examine how influential figures in Russia’s political and religious 
circles have interacted with their past since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, scholars have studied the “transition” of post-
socialist countries.  Some scholars, like anthropologist Elizabeth Dunn in her book about 
a Gerber baby food plant in Poland, focused on the economic transition, charting how 
formerly centrally planned economies made the change to market based economies.
3
  My 
thesis leaves an in-depth analysis of the transition of systems to others like Dunn, while 
focusing on “the something more,” mentioned by Verdery, that goes into legitimatizing 
new governments.  Examining conversations and actions surrounding the dead bodies of 
the Romanovs and Vladimir Lenin shows how those in power – specifically those in the 
Kremlin and the highest reaches of the Russian Orthodox Church – view morality, how 
people should be buried in order to maximize the power of dead bodies and illuminate 
national values, and the best way to remake the past. 
The idea of remaking the past in this thesis comes from the book Retroactive 
Justice: Prehistory of Post-Communism by historian Istvan Rev.  In his book, Rev 
examines how the past of post-socialist countries, in particular Hungary’s past, is dealt 
with and reshaped in the post-Soviet period: 
                                                 
3
 Elizabeth Dunn, Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004). 
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Compression under State Socialism was not only spatial but temporal as well.  
Revolutions, regime changes in general, and Communist takeovers in particular 
invite historical revision, past actions under new descriptions.  New histories are 
made by category change.  After revolutions–and revolutionary changes–as 
Thomas Kuhn has famously claimed, we live in a different world… A new 
distribution of historical objects–the events, the ideas, and the dead of the past–
requires not only a certain number of possible new choices but– as Michael 
Foucault remarked–new excluded possibilities as well… At any given moment 
history became foreshortened, retrospectively foreseen in a different way.  The 
changed perspective created new continuities, new chronologies by exclusion, 
which in turn compressed the elapsed historical time…Historical figures, the 
dead, the favored dead, have always been our contemporaries.  In this part of the 
world the dead, any dead, might resurface unannounced any moment.
4
     
Rev also specifically deals with how dead bodies are used in this reshaping: 
If graves can (and sometimes should) be opened, if the solitude of the dead cannot 
be honored, if the past is not envisioned as being over yet, then the objects, the 
events, the ideas, and the dead of the past could be revisited and remade: not as 
double but as if each of them were the original, the real one.  The object of my 
study is the remake: the remake of the dead, the martyr turned unknown soldier 
and back again, the criminal who is redeemed as innocent, holy days banalized, 
cemeteries restructured, and unremarkable figures presented as historical 
monstrosities, ordinary places rebuilt as sites of horror…[Rev’s book] deals with 
bodies and objects that are presented as visibly, even tangibly, incarnate.
5
    
While Rev’s book is more specifically about Hungary, this idea of remaking the past–that 
the past as it is presented now is different from the past as it was for specific social and 
political reasons–and the dead being contemporaries is highly useful in understanding 
why issues discussed in this thesis continue to be significant.  While Nicholas II, his 
family, and Lenin are long dead, their legacy continues when politicians and others 
invoke the deads’ names concurrently with their own ideas, pulling them into modern 
politics. 
                                                 
4
 István Rév, Retroactive Justice : Prehistory of Post-Communism (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 5-7. 
 
5
 Ibid., 7-8. 
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When examining the topics of remaking, burial, and values in Russia, both 
historically and presently, a clear idea of how post-socialist Russia was shaped is formed.  
The burial of the Romanovs and the “unburial”6 of Lenin are sites in which this shaping 
takes place and are sites of political and cultural contestation.  The 1998 burial of the 
Romanovs showcases the instability of the time, as well as the weakness of Yeltsin’s 
regime as he failed to utilize the power of dead bodies to legitimate governments.  The 
actual reburial of the Romanovs showed the decentralization of political power with 
many different groups and people fighting to get their version of history or their cause 
recognized.  The reburial also showed the growing power of the Russian Orthodox 
Church as their version of history became the publically accepted version as events.  
Additionally, the planning for the ceremony showed a desire to erase the Soviet past with 
a heavy reliance on tsarist imagery.  The unburial of Vladimir Lenin’s body7 provides 
valuable insight into Russia’s cultural and political sphere since 1991 and moreover, how 
Russia has proceeded with Vladimir Putin in charge.  While Yeltsin was in power, not 
                                                 
6
 Lenin’s body’s entombment in Red Square is difficult to encapsulate in one word.  I will mostly use 
“unburial” or describe Lenin’s body as being on Red Square when discussing its current location and 
situation.  Lenin’s body is considered unburied by most, so any future removal and interment would be 
termed a burial.  However, some –mostly communists- have argued that Lenin is actually buried in his 
body’s current location and as such would be reburied in the future.  This will be discussed in greater depth 
later in the thesis but, for simplicity’s sake, I will refer to Lenin as if he is not buried.  This is not an 
indictment of the argument that Lenin is currently buried, which I find to be a sound argument, but rather a 
way of avoiding confusion. 
 
7
 In discussing dead bodies it is difficult to choose pronouns and names.  Once dead, especially in terms of 
this thesis, people become dead bodies and dead bodies are objects.  Objects, in English at least, are not he 
or she but it.  However, it is uncomfortable and unwieldy to consistently refer to Lenin’s body or Nicholas 
II’s body.  The difference between “Lenin is in Red Square” and “Lenin’s body is in Red Square” is small 
but important.  In this thesis I will attempt to use the term “Lenin’s body” but the very fact that this is a 
problem shows the unique nature of dead bodies and suggests the value of examining them.  Sometimes, it 
seems like Lenin or the Romanovs are still alive based on how they are invoked and thus, occasionally I 
will refer to these bodies as if they are still alive, with him and her and just their names, because in the 
popular consciousness, it is like they are. 
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much was done about Lenin’s body, despite a strong desire of many in power to have it 
buried.  However, since Putin has taken office, a strong consolidation of state power 
shows that Lenin could have been buried, Putin just chose not to.  It is this choice that I 
will examine as well as the significance of this act/not acting.  The burial of the 
Romanovs and the unburial of Lenin are microcosms of larger currents of cultural change 
in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union and reveal much about Russia’s 
leadership’s negotiation with its own past while attempting to shape the future.   
Reburial of the famous dead happens all over the world.  In Russia, one of the 
more notable reburials occurred in 1961 with the removal of Stalin’s body from its place 
next to Lenin’s body in the Red Square mausoleum and its reburial in the Kremlin wall 
during destalinization.
8
  However, Russia is not the only country to rebury its famous 
dead.  For example, famous Argentinian first lady Eva Peron was embalmed and placed 
in a mausoleum after her death in 1952.  When her husband was exiled in 1955, her body 
accompanied him to Italy and then later on to Spain before being sent back to Argentina 
in 1974.
9
 As Peron’s displacement and this thesis will show, most reburials are politically 
motivated.  An examination of reburials in the former Eastern Bloc shows how political 
reburials crossed political boundaries in the formerly Socialist states.  Throughout 
Eastern Europe there have been many reburials of political figures depending on the 
current political climate.  It is specifically interesting and useful to briefly look at 
Hungary, which has had several reburials in the tumultuous post-war era. Rev explains 
                                                 
8
 Georges Bortoli, The Death of Stalin (New York: Praeger, 1975). 196 
 
9
 Verdery, 2. 
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that the “history of Hungary is one of battles lost… [and] normal public rituals are 
therefore funerals and burials rather than victory parades.”10  Thus, for Hungarians the 
dead are an important part of everyday life.  The historian Karl Benziger expands upon 
this by explaining the concept of kegyeleti, defined as duty towards the dead, which is 
synonymous with Emile Durkheim’s concept of piacular rites – rites of sadness, fear and 
anger.  Berziger claims that the “political connection between personal funeral ritual and 
the state is made explicit in national public rituals that mimic the very personal 
remembrance that is the essence of kegyeleti ritual.”11  Accordingly, when Hungarians 
wanted to demonstrate, they chose to do their duty to the dead.  While Hungary and 
Russia are different countries with different histories, they have shared at least part of 
their more recent history and both needed to create a new society in the wake of the 
collapse of their Socialist regimes.  By looking at the country that clearly uses their dead 
to create political and social change, one can extrapolate information and adapt it to the 
case of post-Soviet Russia.   
Imre Nagy was one of these Hungarian dead, the most important reburial of 1989.  
He had been the Prime Minister of Hungary during the 1956 revolution.  His attempts at 
reform led to him being hanged in 1958.  He was buried in an unmarked grave, without a 
coffin, and facedown.  In fact, when he was exhumed his bones turned out to be mixed 
with those of a giraffe.
12
  His burial broke long standing Hungarian taboos about burials 
                                                 
10
 Karl P. Benziger, Imre Nagy, Martyr of the Nation : Contested History, Legitimacy, and Popular 
Memory in Hungary (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2008), 7. 
 
11
 Berzigner, 7. 
 
12
 Verdery, 16. 
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by denying the families of the dead an opportunity to bury and remember their dead.
13
  
By ignoring traditional burial practices, those who buried Nagy did so in a way that 
disappeared him from history and showed their disrespect.  In 1989, he and those 
executed with him were reburied with full honors and with tens of thousands in 
attendance.
14
   As times changed, so did the use of Nagy’s body.  In 1989, Nagy needed 
to be celebrated and given the respect he was previously denied.  As this thesis will 
demonstrate similar dynamics are at work in the post-Soviet case. 
Reburying the political dead is about more than a proper burial.  Verdery argues 
that when former heads of state- like Nicholas II, Nagy, and Lenin- are reburied it 
indicates a struggle over form of polity.
15
  Struggles over polity indicate why Nicholas II 
would be reburied but in order to understand why his family and servants were buried 
with him and why Lenin is not buried, one needs to understand the idea of a proper burial 
as well as remaking.  Rev helps fill out the framework in his book Retroactive Justice, 
about the reburial of Nagy.  In the book, as suggested above, he explains that the dead are 
not only our contemporaries but are remade in the present to fill a particular niche in 
society.  
As previously mentioned, post-Soviet Russia had two sets of famous dead bodies, 
the Romanovs and Vladimir Lenin, which they could bury.  On July 17, 1998, the first set 
was buried when the Romanovs and their servants were interred with full honors at Peter 
                                                 
13
 Berzigner, 27. 
 
14
 Verdery, 29. 
 
15
 Verdery, 17. 
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and Paul Fortress, exactly eighty years after their murder by members of the Red Army in 
the basement of the Ipatiev house in Yekaterinburg to stop them being freed by the White 
Army.  Lenin, on the other hand, still lies unburied in his mausoleum, about ninety years 
since his death and twenty-four years after the end of the empire he created.   By 
examining the narratives and context surrounding these two sets of bodies, one can 
examine how Russian leaders are shaping its transition from socialism through looking at 
how the lives, symbols, and legacy of these dead are treated and remade.  Lenin and the 
Romanovs have such strong images and associations in Russia’s recent history.  Their 
bodies have a political currency that has been missing in the rebuilt Russian state.  Not 
only do they represent power and “stable” leadership but they also tap into people’s 
emotions and ideas of morality and mortality.  The concreteness of bodies allows for 
great political machinations and an ability for the state to build a new image for itself out 
of the image it has created for the dead body.  Consequently, someone who died and was 
buried a traitor can be reburied a freedom fighter in a time that a country or group is 
dealing with oppression.  For example, the Romanovs were transformed from enemies of 
the people into innocent victims of the Soviet regime when Yeltsin needed to consolidate 
power; this had the added political advantage of avoiding Soviet imagery and thus, not 
reminding people of his own Soviet past and, at the same time, strengthening ties with the 
Russian Orthodox Church.  However, despite being at least partially responsible for the 
murder of the Romanovs, Lenin remains at least physically honored by the new Russian 
society.  So far, the need to transform the image of Lenin has not been great enough or 
accepted enough by those in charge to remove him from his mausoleum.  At the moment 
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his body lies, pride of place, in Red Square, his name still linked to the system he helped 
create.  However, as time goes on and more and more everyday Russians believe Lenin 
should be buried in a cemetery, maybe there will be a moment when he will be 
transformed.  By being unburied and in the public eye at all times, there is a way that 
Lenin’s body is constantly ripe for remaking and constantly an issue. 
This thesis, then, will explore several of the many varied ways that the dead 
bodies of famous Russians can be used to remake the past, examine the morals of the 
present, and attempt to create a new future.       
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2. Fit for a King?: The Reburial of the Last Tsar and his 
Family 
The reburial of the Romanovs is significant as it became the first, and to date the only, 
reconciliation of the Soviet era through a burial of major figures.  However, this 
reconciliation was not without its troubles and highlighted how politically fraught the 
simple act of burying someone can be.  After a lengthy fight over where their final resting 
place should be, who would be in attendance at the funeral, and even the authenticity of 
the remains, on July 17, 1998, Tsar Nicholas II, some of his family, and their faithful 
servants were interred in St Petersburg´s Saint Peter and Paul Cathedral before a crowd of 
people including surviving Romanov family members and then Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin.  The main body of the cathedral is the traditional resting place of the tsars since 
Peter the Great.  However, the remains of those shot in 1918 were placed in the chapel of 
St. Catherine the Martyr due to a stipulation in Alexander III’s will.  It stated that the 
Saint Peter and Paul Cathedral had to become the burial place for emperors and 
empresses only; other family members had to be buried separately.
1
  Previously, the 
chapel only held the remains of Marfa Matveyevna, second wife of Tsar Fyodor 
Alekseyevich.  While all of the tsar’s children now reside in the chapel of St. Catherine 
the Martyr, only three of the five children were buried with their parents in 1998.  The 
remains of the Tsarevich Alexei and his sister Maria were still unaccounted for (some 
scientists argued that it is Anastasia's – not Maria's – remains that were missing).2  These 
                                                 
1
 Federalʹnaia arkhivnaia sluzhba Rossii et al. Ritual Pechalʹnogo Kortezha : Ritual Pokhoron Rossiiskikh 
Imperatorov (St. Petersburg, Russia: Spetsialʹnaia lit-ra, 1998).  9. 
 
2
 John Varoli, "Burying the Romanovs." Russian Life 41, no. 7, 1998: 22-27.  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/224004733?accountid=10598.  
     12 
missing bones helped fuel the rumors that those being buried were not really the 
Romanovs and also that one of the daughters, notably Anastasia, actually escaped their 
family’s fate.  Thus, even in receiving a proper burial, the Romanovs were not able to 
rest.  They carried the burden of being martyrs; physically and rhetorically separated 
from their ancestors.  The last Tsar and his family became a symbol for both the cruelty 
of the Soviet regime and the path in which Russia should take from then out.    
The funeral happened exactly eighty years after the Romanovs and their servants 
were killed.  Their reburial was a relatively modest, hour-long event, with a budget of 
five million rubles ($820,000), which is far less than what was spent on Nicholas II’s 
father, Alexander III’s, funeral in 1894.3  In fact, the contrast between the deaths of 
Alexander III and Nicholas II is stark.  Nicholas was shot and then buried in an unmarked 
grave, left to rot.  More than half a decade later his body was dug up, examined for years, 
before finally being laid to rest adjacent to his ancestral resting place. Alexander died 
surrounded by family, in the south Crimea home where he was resting for his health.  
After his death, his body was transported back to a mourning St Petersburg.  When 
describing the scene in the city, one eyewitness claimed “the capital had never been in 
such deep mourning: dark draperies covered many building, everywhere black-and-white 
mourning flags hang, special mourning arches were erected in many places.”4  It is quite 
obvious that the reburial of Nicholas II only bore a vague similarity to the burial of his 
father.  While the whole country went into mourning for Alexander III and then gave him 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 22. 
 
4
 Rossii et al, 91. 
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a funeral befitting his status, Nicholas II was given a funeral that, while probably grander 
than most funerals at the time, paled in comparison.  Then what was the point of 
reburying Nicholas II in a ceremony that was clearly supposed to be his due as tsar but 
fell far short of historical precedents?  Also, why would Yeltsin attend and legitimize 
such a ceremony?  The answers to these questions can be found in the politics governing 
Russia in the nineties.   
2.1 The Past as the Present: Using the Imperial Past in the Democratic 
Present  
As historian Catherine Merridale explains in her book Red Fortress: History and 
Illusion in the Kremlin, the new Russian Federation faced many issues as a newly formed 
state, such as a rising crime rate, unstable economy, and the collapse of public 
infrastructure:   
In this uncompromising environment the challenge Russia’s leaders faced was to 
build a credible, resilient and dignified state.  The tsars had used religious 
iconography and stunning public splendor to achieve this; Lenin had invoked the 
sacred blood of martyrs and the proletarian revolution.  From Ivan the Terrible 
and Mikhail Romanov to Stalin, no-one had expected any newly formed regime to 
flourish without a convincing pedigree and some sort of mission.  In the 1990’s, 
however, the new state had few options on either score.  In most societies 
…shared values tend to go unspoken and are almost always fluid anyway.  But 
post-Communist Russia faced a moral crisis.  Yeltsin was keen to make sure that 
it remained neither Soviet nor Communist, but Russia was not European and its 
people were not ready to accept the triumph of the west.  That left a void, a kind 
of vertigo, especially in a society that had lived so long in the shadow of 
successive all-encompassing ideas.
5
        
To help shape the new society, Yeltsin relied on a very common strategy for nation 
building: building on the image of the past.  Throughout history, many regimes had 
invoked their version of the past to help build legitimacy.  In Russia, this had previously 
                                                 
5
 Catherine Merridale, Red Fortress: History and Illusion in the Kremlin (Metropolitan Books, 2013): 371. 
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been done by the tsarist and Soviet government.  However, for Yeltsin and other leaders 
of the new Russia this task was more difficult.  They could not celebrate the Soviet 
socialist system in the new capitalist system.  Problematically, these new leaders had 
been raised as Communists; many of them built their careers by denouncing capitalism 
and everything non-Soviet.  One of the clearest instances of this conflict is the case of 
Yeltsin and the Ipatiev house, where the Romanovs were killed.  In his days as the 
region’s Party boss in the late 1980’s, Yeltsin ordered the demolition of the house to 
prevent it from becoming a shrine to the fallen tsar.  Yet, when he later became the 
democratically elected president, a shrine or some other cultural monument was exactly 
what he needed to help legitimate his new society.
6
  As historian and politician Michael 
Ignatieff states in his article about the reburial of Nicholas II, “[t]he painful truth lies… in 
the fact that the order for the Romanovs' execution came directly from Moscow, from the 
current inhabitant of the mausoleum in Red Square. To millions of Russians who still 
venerate the mummy in that tomb, Yekaterinburg was not murder but regicide.”7  
Due to this “painful truth” Yeltsin and other Russian leaders relied on the 
nostalgia for the tsars and imperial history in order to stabilize and legitimize their state.    
One instance of reliance on nostalgia to legitimize part of the new Russian state was 
rebuilding Konstantin Ton’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, which had been destroyed by 
the Soviet government and eventually replaced with a swimming pool.  Mostly the 
brainchild of Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, the project in order to recreate the cathedral 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 371-376. 
         
7
Michael Ignatieff, “Beyond the Grave,” The New Republic, August 10, 1998. 
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started in 1994.  During 1995 and 1996, not coincidently election years, pensioners sat in 
the Moscow metro, shaking collection boxes – decorated with pictures of the lost 
cathedral – at travelers.  As Merridale explains “[a]t the time when the Communist Party 
were gathering large numbers of votes, syrupy references to Russia’s rebirth and the 
memory of imperial Moscow, channeled through the cathedral project, served to boost 
the ratings of both Yeltsin and Luzhkov.”8  Another project aimed at literally, as well as 
figuratively, rebuilding imperial Russia in hopes of creating legitimacy was the 
renovation of the Kremlin, also occurring in the early 1990’s.  The restoration process 
started in 1992 and soon Yeltsin had also signed off on the restoration of the Grand 
Kremlin Palace, which would include the resurrection of the nineteenth-century throne 
room.
9
  Yeltsin wrote in his diary that this restoration of imperial grandeur was important 
so that when billionaires like Mikhail Khordorkovsky came to the Kremlin, they would 
realize that “they have come for an audience with the government and not a chat with 
some kind of uncle.”10  These two cases show how Yeltsin and other leaders attempted to 
rebuild the imperial landscape both in Moscow and in the minds of the Russian people.  
The boost in rating for the 1995, 1996 elections shows that this imperial nostalgia might 
actually legitimize the state.      
This thesis deals with how post-Soviet Russia specifically uses – or does not use – 
dead bodies as a way to legitimize and stabilize the state, much in the way that Luzhkov 
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used the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior to help win an election.  As 
anthropologist Katherine Verdery states, the reburials of former heads of state “almost 
invariably indicated struggles over form of polity: how much territory should we have, 
whether it should be a monarchy or a republic, whether or not it should acknowledge 
achievements of the communist period.”11  As head of the newly formed Russian 
Federation, Yeltsin constantly had to deal with questions of polity.  Even before the 
reburial of Nicholas II, Yeltsin had reached back into the past to find stabilizing images 
to legitimize his regime.  In addition to renovating the Kremlin, Yeltsin tried to present 
himself as the heir of the Russian State and its traditions. At both of his inaugurations, 
Glinka's “Life for the Tsar” was sung and he took the oath of office before a gigantic 
replica of the imperial double-eagle.
12
  In regards to the reburial of Nicholas II, Yeltsin 
seems to have seen what could be in Russia. After the funeral, Yeltsin wrote in his diary 
that it was sad that Russia had “lost the previous historical relics of the monarchy, that we 
have lost our sense of wholeness and continuity of our history.  How desirable it would 
have been to have it all restored in our country.”13  Yeltsin was not the only one longing 
to restore the past, with both the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian 
Federation Communist Party (RFCP) wanting to be restored to their former glory and 
seeing the burial of the Romanovs as a site of contestation.  Due to this contestation, the 
reburial, including the arrangement of it, becomes a useful site of examination to see 
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what narratives were being used to in order to shape the new Russia by all three of these 
groups.  
2.2 Tension on High       
Due in large part to the conflicts between the ROC, the RFCP and Yeltsin’s 
government, the reburial of the Romanovs attracted some controversy.  Leading up to the 
ceremony, there was divisive rhetoric and actual divisions between the President and the 
Duma and the Orthodox Church.  Political and religious maneuvering was rampant, with 
every power player in Russia having some sort of stance.  An analysis of these diverse 
groups with opposing opinions helps create a picture of the different factions that held 
power in post-Soviet Russia and how they wanted to shape Russia’s future trajectory.  
The funeral itself also caused strife.  By considering the symbols, music, attendees, 
speeches, and even the burial place and position, we can examine what Rev calls a 
remaking, or what parts of history are now deemed important enough to remake their 
image.  Due to a decree of the Holy Synod of the ROC discussed in-depth later, the last 
of the royal Romanovs were remade as martyrs by the ROC.  Additionally, the decree 
made these remains surrogates for all Soviet victims.   
Yeltsin seemed to focus on the use of tsarist imagery and music to help create a 
shortening time.
14
  Basically, the use of imagery from tsarist times made it seem as 
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though these people died just yesterday and that eighty year interim never occurred.  
Problems arose in that Yeltsin was not strong enough to use this imagery.  The tsar 
reigned absolute, at least in image, but Yeltsin did not want to be an all-powerful head of 
state and the tsarist history and its legacy is not for weak leadership.  Strong leadership in 
the church helped them shape the event while Yeltsin could not grasp and use the image 
he chose to remake.  There was also the issue with Yeltsin not being entirely blameless in 
the Soviet past, meaning he felt more restricted in what he could do around the burial of 
the leaders of the former regime.  
For what could have been an act of reconciliation, behind the scenes of the 
funeral, a battle was waged by the ROC, the Kremlin and the other politicians, all trying 
to gain some sort of power from it.  Yeltsin was struggling to hold onto power while the 
Russian economy struggled spectacularly.  There was drastic economic instability in this 
period, eventually leading to a default on the ruble that caused major disruption in 
economic and social life.
15
  
This economic instability combined with political and social tension to cause 
problems for Yeltsin.  As well as rumblings about the ruble devaluation, people were 
speaking out against Yeltsin.  This ranged from people stating he should not run for a 
third term to a vote in the Duma to form a special committee on impeachment.  In June of 
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1998, CIS Executive Secretary and oligarch Boris Berezovsky called for Yeltsin to 
announce then, two years before the election, that he would not run for a third term as 
President.
16
  The economic and political weakness of Yeltsin’s regime shows why he 
would attempt to use the reburial of the Romanovs to his advantage.  He needed a major 
event that would both curry political and social favor and help strengthen and stabilize his 
faltering government.   
Social tension was also high, coming mainly from the growth of right wing ultra-
nationalism.  With the number of organizations of fascists multiplying, it became 
common to hear about attacks on Central Asian and Caucasian merchants and there was 
even a bombing of a synagogue in Moscow.
17
 In the same speech where Berezovsky said 
he believed Yeltsin should not run for third term, he also stated that he had an interest in 
“diluting the nationalist-patriotic constituency,” a code for fascism, which he saw as the 
greatest danger to Russia if they gained power.
18
  Yeltsin himself addressed the issue of 
fascism and right-wing radicalism in his June 22, 1998 radio address, to commemorate 
the fifty-seventh anniversary of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union.  It is important 
to note that the German invasion of the Soviet Union is a widely recognized event in 
Russia and what the President chose to address would have to be highly significant.  
Yeltsin said: 
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Тогда в Германии все начиналось с поиска врага. Врага видели в людях 
другой национальности. С другим цветом кожи. В тех, кто исповедовал 
другую веру.  Полвека назад наша страна спасла мир от фашизма. Но 
сегодня именно в России он поднимает голову, одурманивая молодежь… 
Вновь раздаются призывы к твердой руке и палочной дисциплине. Кому-то 
это кажется лучшим выходом из нынешней непростой ситуации…Меня 
тревожит, что реальность угрозы экстремизма сегодня в России чувствуют 
не все. Но она есть. И это очень опасно для общества.  Те, кто сегодня 
бредит целями национального превосходства и антисемитизма, должны 
спросить себя: понимают ли они, что творят? Неужели россияне позволят, 
чтобы самая страшная идеология, которую знало человечество, пустила 
корни на нашей земле?  Наш общий долг перед памятью жертв фашизма -- 
не дать возродиться "чуме XX века". Мы не вправе предать тех, кто 
однажды уже победил это чудовищное зло.  
[WWII] all began in Germany with a search for an enemy. An enemy was seen in 
people of other nationalities, people with different colored skin, and in those who 
profess a different faith.  Half a century ago, our country saved the world from 
fascism. But today, in Russia, fascism is raising its head, clouding our young 
people's minds… Calls for a firm hand and the discipline of the stick are being 
heard once again. To some it seems the best way out of our current difficult 
situation. Under the cover of lofty rhetoric about the rebirth of Russia and its 
national spirit, people are again looking for enemies…It worries me that the 
reality of the threat of extremism in Russia today is not felt by all. But it is there. 
And it is very dangerous to society.  Those who today are ranting about the 
objectives of ethnic superiority and anti-Semitism need to ask themselves, do they 
realize what they are doing? Is it really possible that citizens of Russia could 
allow the most terrible ideology mankind has ever known to take root in our land?  
Our common duty to the memory of the victims of fascism is not to revive the 
"plague of the 20th century." We have no right to betray those who had once won 
against this monstrous evil.
19
  
This speech has several components which are important for this thesis.  Firstly, Yeltsin 
said he is against “a firm hand and the discipline of the stick” which is the opposite view 
to that expressed by current Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of his ascension 
to power, explored later in the thesis.  Secondly, he is clearly marking this extremism as 
important by devoting a large part of his speech to denouncing it.  Lastly, it is interesting 
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that Yeltsin calls fascism “the most terrible ideology mankind has ever known” and a 
“monstrous evil.”  Thus, it becomes clearer why many moderates became wary of 
backing the reburial ceremony for the Romanovs after it was backed by ultra-nationalists.  
This situation also highlights part of Yeltsin’s problem.  He could not use the Soviet past 
as it would be distasteful and remind people of his own complicity in the past.  However, 
the reburial of the Romanovs, which could have been used to stabilize the government, 
became associated with the less desirable elements of the government, such as the hyper-
nationalist/fascists.  
On the opposite side of the spectrum from the ultra-nationalists was the Russian 
Federation Communist Party, who still held some power in the nineties.  The RFCP were 
behind the push to impeach Yeltsin.  They also had strong opinions about the reburial of 
the Romanovs.  They believed that the ceremony was unjust as they viewed Nicholas II 
as a tyrant who was justifiably executed. Additionally, they held some fear that the next 
burial might be that of Lenin’s body.20 
Other political tensions around the reburial involved regional power players who 
wanted the remaking of the Romanovs to happen in their cities.  Saint Petersburg Mayor 
and chairman of the governmental commission on the reburial of the Romanovs, Anatolii 
Sobchak publically stated that he thought the imperial remains should be buried in the 
crypt of the Peter and Paul Cathedral- even with the controversy.  In a 1998 interview, he 
said that “the subject of discussion may be their authenticity, the funeral ritual, but to 
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debate on where to bury means to inflict an insult to the memory of the Tsarist family.”21   
St Petersburg was chosen to be the remains final resting place, leading Luzhkov, the 
high-profile mayor of Moscow who rebuilt the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, not to 
attend the ceremony.  He was far from the only politician not attending.  Before the 
ceremony only Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, who at one time was thought to be 
next president and who chaired the government commission on the identification of the 
Tsar’s remains, was confirmed as attending.  Even Yeltsin was not originally planning on 
attending the ceremony.  During a meeting with Patriarch Aleksy II, Yeltsin and the 
Patriarch decided that neither of them would take part in the ceremony.  Instead, 
messages from them would be read by their representatives.
22
  So, even attending the 
ceremony itself became a political act, in which by not going one could voice protest for 
almost any slight.  It is interesting then, that Yeltsin ultimately was present at the reburial.  
Before the ceremony, Yeltsin and the ROC seemed to be of the same mind, with Yeltsin 
mostly following the ROC’s lead.  It seems that by attending the ceremony, Yeltsin 
wanted to create his own stance on the matter and strengthen his legitimacy outside of the 
church.    Yet, this was not a unifying event.  It did not help stabilize the government, nor 
does it have seemed to have helped any political groups further their own agenda, as was 
the case in Hungary with Nagy and Rajk.  The ruble still crashed, and Nemtsov and 
others lost their political cachet because of the crash.  The RFCP did not come out ahead 
either, despite their strong stance against the government and the reburial.  They only 
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succeeded in not burying Lenin.  Rather ironically though, while the Communists 
succeeded in not burying Lenin, Nicholas II and his family were remade as martyrs.  In 
fact, the only people who came out ahead were not any government officials or 
traditionally acknowledged political figures but rather the ROC, who used the occasion to 
gain more power and strengthened their move towards political power. 
2.3 The Russian Orthodox Church 
While the Russian Orthodox Church gained from the burial of the Romanovs, 
they were also far from united.  The ROC was portrayed by the media as refusing to 
endorse the reburial on the grounds that the bones being interred might not be those of the 
Nicholas II.
23
 However, Viktor Aksyuchits, an advisor to Nemtsov, stated that he was not 
worried by the ROC’s position on the burial of the imperial family's remains. He said that 
neither the Holy Synod nor its members had ever publicly cast doubt on the results of the 
remains.  In Aksyuchits’ view, the ROC was concerned by the controversy over the 
identity of the remains and it did not wish to endorse the position of either side in the 
dispute.
24
  This shows that the ROC was powerful enough that their view on the remains 
caused the government to hasten to assure people that the Church had not, in fact, stated 
that the remains were not those of the Romanovs.   
The official stance of the ROC towards the remains found in Yekaterinburg was 
adopted by the Holy Synod on June 9, 1998.  The first part of the statement was that on 
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the 80th anniversary of the execution of the imperial family, a memorial service for the 
souls of murdered innocents would be performed in all churches of the ROC.  
Furthermore, members of the lower clergy of the ROC were authorized to be present at 
the burial ceremony. Finally and most importantly, the burial service was not for 
members of the imperial family but for victims of a militantly antireligious regime.  The 
Holy Synod also advised the government to bury the remains in a symbolic 
grave/monument.
25
  Thus, the ROC clearly fixed its stance, this ceremony was not for the 
Romanovs but for those killed during Soviet times.  This remaking of the Romanovs into 
political martyrs was the most effective remaking of the reburial.  Not only did it allow 
for the ROC to reestablish dominance on a national level but it allowed them to control 
the language of the day by making the prayer to all the “innocent victims” rather than 
specifically the Romanovs.  Moreover, they controlled and scripted what was to be the 
only real reconciliation on a national scale of Soviet atrocities.  The re-establishment of 
the ROC’s dominance will be discussed more in chapter two but for now, I want to note 
the importance of the fact that its position, or what was presented as its position by the 
media, on the authenticity of the remains influenced the view of ordinary Russians.  At 
the time of the reburial, many people believed the ROC was right and that the remains 
were frauds, though most experts accept the DNA evidence shows the remains are those 
of the Romanovs and their servants.
26
  These facts, taken together, show the extent to 
which the ROC successfully used the burial of the Romanovs to enhance its own 
authority. 
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The ROC was divided about whether the burial should take place largely because 
it was not clear that the bodies were the Romanovs, while many Communists were 
against the reburial because they considered the deaths of the Romanovs to be legitimate 
regicide rather than murder.  Such rifts demonstrate the extent to which consideration of 
the reburial raised and symbolized deep contests in the political, social, and cultural 
realms.  The question mentioned earlier of whether the killing of Nicholas II was regicide 
or murder shows how Yeltsin’s complicated involvement with the burial of the 
Romanovs demonstrates how these dead bodies become symbolic of a kind of cultural 
and social transition. During the funeral service, the priest said a prayer for “innocent 
victims” killed by the Bolsheviks, showing that the Romanovs were just the start of 
many. Yeltsin continued this rhetoric when he stated that by “burying the remains of the 
innocent victims…we want to expiate the sins of our ancestors.”27 This statement shifts 
the blame onto generations of dead Russians, allowing those present to feel innocent of 
such crimes.  And yet, Yeltsin is directly connected to trying to destroy the influence of 
Tsar Nicholas II with the previously discussed bulldozing of the Iaptiev House.  
Consequently, the ceremony was not the reconciliation it was supposed to be but instead 
can be viewed as a veneration of the tsarist past by former Soviet officials who were 
denouncing the Soviet government. Due to the unfavorable state of the Russian economy 
and the Duma, one would think that Yeltsin would want to rebury Nicolas II as a way of 
consolidating power and indicating where Russia was heading.  However, the ceremony 
did not cement Yeltsin in the Russian consciousness as he resigned from office less than 
two years later.   
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2.4 A Burial Unfit for an Emperor  
 In an interview with the Moscow Times, Grand Duchess Leonida Georgiyevna—
grandmother of 16-year-old Prince Georgy, one of the leading pretenders to the Romanov 
throne— explained that her branch of the family would not be at the reburial because 
they were unhappy with the organization of it.  She cited the modesty of the ceremony as 
her reason for not coming; "It has not been organized in a way that befits an emperor," 
she said, adding that she would have liked the reburial to be organized along the lines of 
past burials.
28
 
In 1998, the Romanovs received a more traditional burial than they originally 
received; however, it was not what they would have received if they had died with the 
empire still in place.  Firstly, more people would have cared.  As mentioned above, the 
whole city of St Petersburg went into mourning for Alexander III while barely anyone 
showed up to watch the Romanovs funeral procession in 1998.
29
  Secondly, Tsar 
Nicholas II would not have been relegated to the side chapel and would been placed in 
the main cathedral.  This displacement is symbolically important.  Placing Nicholas II 
with his family and servants shows that his most important role was not being tsar but 
being a victim of the Bolsheviks.  This importance is shown with the prayer being not for 
him or his family but for all the victims.  Thus, in 1998, a proper burial for Nicholas II 
was one that acknowledged his importance but did not give him a funeral fit for a tsar.  
Instead, he and his funeral became a surrogate for all the funerals that could not happen, 
for all those placed in unmarked graves, for those who were not famous enough to be 
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found and reburied publicly.  While this is a noble cause, it can be assumed that, had he a 
choice, Nicholas might have chosen to be placed where his father and father’s father were 
buried and be remembered for what he was, the Tsar of the Russian Empire, not a victim 
of Bolshevism.  Then again, maybe not, maybe he would have been honored to represent 
those who died.  As mentioned, this is why dead bodies are highly symbolic and useful in 
a political context; people, from politicians to regular people, can project onto these dead 
bodies whatever ideal, history, or symbolism they wish because the person is not around 
to object.  In context, both burials of the Romanovs showed the world what the current 
government thought of them.  In 1918, the new Socialist government disappeared the 
bodies, much like Nagy was disappeared after his execution.  They were buried in a way 
that showed that they were less than, that they didn’t even deserve a regular burial.  The 
reburial of the Romanovs in 1998 undid this disappearing.  Now, the bodies were 
afforded a grand public funeral.  Yet, not only was this funeral was not as grand as the 
funeral of the tsar traditionally was but the bodies were honored not as that of the Tsar 
and his family but as martyrs and symbols of all the victims of the Soviet regime.  Both 
burials fit their different time and contexts and were symbolic of the struggles happening 
at the time.  The same bodies meant different things and were able to send different 
messages.    
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3. The Perversion of the Body of Vladimir Lenin 
 
As Vladimir Lenin’s body sits in Red Square, slowly becoming more wax than man, the 
question can be asked, does it still play an important role in Russian culture?   During 
Soviet times, Lenin and his body held political currency.  Things approved by Lenin got 
done, even after his death.  In fact, the removal of Stalin’s body from their shared 
mausoleum in 1961 was carried out in the name of Lenin when, at a Party Congress, one 
member claimed that Lenin had appeared to her in a dream and said “It is unpleasant for 
me to be beside Stalin, who brought such misfortune to the party.”1  So, does Lenin’s 
power to legitimize decisions continue in the Russian Federation?  Will claiming that 
Lenin came to you in a dream still add a veneer of legitimacy to your plans? If not, if 
Lenin’s name and body have no power or place in Russia today, why is it still in his 
mausoleum in Red Square?   
This chapter seeks to address these questions.  However, unlike the reburial of the 
Romanovs, there are very few concrete answers when it comes to Lenin, mostly 
springing from the incomplete nature of his remains.  Lenin is dead but not buried, which 
leads to unease.  It is arguable that Lenin should have already been buried at the end of 
the Soviet period, either in the flurry of reburials across the Eastern Bloc discussed in the 
introduction or, in a Soviet/Russian context, following the footsteps of Stalin who was 
removed from the mausoleum where Lenin’s body still resides and reburied after his 
ideology fell out of favor.  Of course, one answer to the puzzle is that Lenin is already 
buried, which will be explained later in the chapter.  The weakness of Yeltsin’s regime, 
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especially compared to the relative strength of the RFCP at the time, partly explains why 
Lenin was not reburied in the nineties, but things in Russia have changed in the new 
millennium.     This chapter will present several reasons as to why it is prudent for Putin 
not to bury Lenin, under what circumstances Lenin’s burial would be useful, to whom, 
and why a connection to Lenin and the Soviet Union might be not as politically deadly as 
it was in the ninetites.  It will also show part of the new political reality in Russia, 
featuring a strong central government with ties to the church and less direct need to 
establish the sort of legitimacy political reburials carry.  In this new Russia, as in the old, 
the moral and the political are intertwined, and this thesis argues that Lenin’s reburial 
functions as both a moral and a political issue—and that Lenin’s body continues to be 
used as both political and moral capital by Putin.    
The question of what to do with Lenin’s body reflects the political and social 
maneuvering implicit in the question, what is Russia’s future, also the eternal Russian 
questions кто виновать и что делать?2  The current placement of Lenin’s body and the 
rituals that surround it, as well as the possible future burial practices and rites, are all sites 
of political power because they connect to already established bases of power.  Currently, 
Lenin’s body is connected physically to the Kremlin and Red Square, as well as drawing 
political power from his previous association with these spaces.  His body is also 
connected with the Cult of Lenin.  These places and ideals were cemented to Lenin’s 
body and his symbolic usefulness during the Soviet era.  Lenin and his mausoleum—and 
how Soviet and post-Soviet leaders have engaged with them—are an example of what 
socialist Christel Lane calls “cultural management.”   In her book The Rites of Rulers, 
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written during the late Soviet period, Lane focuses on the Soviet government and the 
rituals they used to manage and shape the Soviet people.  She defines cultural 
management as the act of shaping informal and formal practices through government 
intervention.  Cultural management can be achieved in many ways, such as the censoring 
of artistic endeavors.  In some cases, governments can create new events, rituals, or 
symbols or modify pre-existing ones to help shape the nation.
3
  
Lenin and his mausoleum were integral to Soviet cultural management as the Cult 
of Lenin, featuring Lenin as the man-god of Communism, helped to reinforce the new 
norms within society
4
.  The Soviet government cemented the nebulous ideals of 
communism in the real body of Lenin.  His corporeal nature, which was of great use 
during the Soviet period, becomes more problematic for a new Russian government 
because the remains were embedded with a particular political power.  This power was 
that of spreading Soviet cultural norms.  So, a democratic federation attempting to 
distance itself from Communism will have problems not only utilizing Lenin’s body and 
image as well as what Lenin represents in general.  A similar tension was seen in Yeltsin 
attempting to build political power but having to distance himself from his own Soviet 
past.  In fact, Lenin’s remains’ primary use for Yeltsin would have been to bury them in 
an attempt to bury to the Soviet past.  Yeltsin clearly understood the necessity of burying 
Lenin’s body but lacked the political clout to make it happen.  Putin, on the other hand, 
has no need to distance himself from the Soviet past at the moment; however he does not 
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lack the power to bury Lenin, so currently it would seem Lenin continues to rest in Red 
Square until he is considered useful again.     
    
3.1 The Utilization of Lenin’s Body in the Soviet Union 
Even before his death, Lenin’s body was considered as a form of cultural 
management.  People wanted to trade upon the “materiality or concreteness” that gives 
bodies “a presence in popular consciousness that is more substantial than that of less 
clearly defined concepts like communism, democracy and capitalism.”5 One group that 
wished to utilize Lenin’s body in such a way was the bogostroitel’stvo movement or 
“god-building” movement, who wished to build the gods of Communism.6  They 
believed in a humanist Marxist religion that was to be “faith in future man, man 
unfettered by shackles of class and individualism.”7  This movement—deemed to be 
“necrophilia” and more dangerous than traditional religion by Lenin—helped build the 
foundation of the Cult of Lenin.
8
  After Lenin’s death, the god-builders were able to 
create their new man-god, using his body as a corporeal anchor for their lofty idealism.  
A Cult of Lenin was built up partly upon the foundations of the bogostroitel’stvo 
movement.  
Throughout the Soviet Union, there was always some veneration of Lenin, with it 
ebbing during the Stalinist period and gaining new monument in the sixties, becoming 
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much more extensive than the original cult of Lenin in the twenties.
9
  The cult helped 
developed the political culture and rhetoric in the formative years of the Soviet Union.  
According to Nina Tumarkin,  
Lenin’s body was to become the focal point for the cult that followed his death.  
Leninism would communicate his political vision to future generations, Lenin 
Corners would serve as a shrine for the veneration of his memory, but the body 
made him simultaneously a proven saint with visibly incorruptible remains and an 
immortal.
10
 
So, while Lenin’s cult had other important parts, such as his image replacing the image of 
saints in the Icon Corner of people’s homes, his preserved body was at the center and 
vitally important for its continuation.  Lenin’s body was so powerful in the cult that even 
foreigners remarked on its’ importance.  In 1928, American author Theodore Dreiser 
wrote about Lenin’s body after a trip to the Soviet Union.  His impression of Lenin was 
that he was “enmeshed in superstition.  So long as he is there, so long as he does not 
change, Communism is safe and the [Soviet Union] will prosper”; yet if something 
happens to Lenin’s body, if it is destroyed or fades “then comes the great sad change- the 
end of [Lenin’s] kindly dream.”11  For many of those in the Soviet Union and specifically 
those who built and continued the Cult of Lenin, Lenin’s body was both the symbol of 
and the anchor of the Communist dream.  Yet, Lenin’s remains remain, while the 
communist ideal crumbled.  As I will argue, this creates a dilemma for late Soviet and 
post-Soviet leaders.    
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3.2 Lenin Today: Historical Treasure or Destroyer of the Natural Order  
Despite what Dreiser described, a change in Lenin’s body was not the harbinger 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
12
  It physically endured the collapse, even if the cult 
of personality did not.  So, what role does Lenin’s body currently play in Russian politics 
and life?  Lenin and his body continue to endure in modern Russia, both physically in his 
mausoleum and in the consciousness of the Russian people, both those alive during 
Soviet times and the new generation who were not brought up under the Cult of Lenin.  
However, as a new generation of Russians comes of age, Lenin’s cultural management 
value would logically be diminished as there has not been the same active push to utilize 
Lenin as a cultural management and legitimization tool. It is necessary to explore if 
people still view Lenin’s body as an entity with power? In his article about symbols and 
the transition from Socialism, Gill makes the point that most Russians’ feelings about 
burying Lenin’s body fall mainly into two categories, moral or historical, with limited 
political feelings. He argues that the political power that Lenin’s body once had 
dissipated when the Soviet Union fell; that today “[i]t is clear that the fate of Lenin’s 
body remains an issue in Russian politics and the body itself is a contested symbol in 
Russian public culture, but it has by no means been a compelling or high priority one.”13 
While Gill states that Lenin’s body is not a “high priority” symbol, it is nevertheless an 
important one as shown by the constant questions over his burial and just the inherent 
power of dead bodies. 
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Gill points to the data that suggests that today’s Russians view Lenin’s burial as a 
moral issue over a political issue.  Those who want a burial most often claim that a burial 
would be in accordance with Christian tradition or because it is the way things are done
14
, 
which to Gill indicates it is a moral issue.
15
  On the other hand, most of those who believe 
that Lenin’s body should stay in Red Square say that Lenin is a symbol of the Soviet Era 
and a great historical figure.
16
  By stating that people view Lenin’s burial as a moral issue 
over a political one, Gill misses the fact that moral issues and political issues are often 
connected.  In Russia especially, religion—which in this case is, at least in part, an 
indicator of morals—has been widely invoked in political culture so that stating that 
something is a purely moral issue is difficult.  What is presented by Gill as the moral 
versus the historical is really two sides to the same political coin.  One side of the coin is 
presenting a moralistic version of political in which people and governments do what is 
morally right and the other side of the coin is a historical version of the political in which 
people and governments do what is necessary to propagate the glory of the nation.  Both 
of which can, and do, exist at the same time in political rhetoric but clash when 
considering Lenin’s body.    
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The Soviet bogostroitel’stvo movement is indicative of this blending of moral and 
political in Russia.  It points to the fact that throughout Russian’s history religion, even 
this new “humanist” religion, is used to dictate political change.  While the Cult of Lenin 
is not a traditional religion, it had elements that mirrored Christianity and was often 
considered at least an imitation of a religion, if not a religion in its own right.  became a 
Christ-like figure whose body may have died, but whose spirit lives eternally in the hearts 
and minds of the builders of Communism.
17
 On the day of his funeral, Pravda’s lead 
editorial not only described Lenin as both moral and immortal and also described him as 
“a religious leader, comparable to but more successful than Mohammed, Christ, and 
Buddha,” due to his salvation of all oppressed people.18  His tomb was supposed to 
surpass Mecca and Jerusalem as a site of pilgrimage.
19
  It was clearly also supposed to 
dictate change in behavior. As Tumarkin states “[t]he Lenin cult was less an actual 
substitute for religion than a party effort to fuse religious and political ritual to mobilize 
the population.”20  The cult was political in nature but prescribed what morals new Soviet 
citizens should have, replacing the ROC which had previously played this role in Russian 
history.     
From its origins, the cult of Lenin was designed to replace the ROC as a powerful 
driving force in Russian political and moral history.  The ROC has been connected to 
Russian government since Kievan Rus’s conversion to Eastern Orthodox Christianity in 
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988.
21
  The ROC gave the government political power and legitimacy during tsarist 
times, using its position of power to uphold the divine right of the tsar to rule and the 
God-given nature of social class, with the ruling classes being socially and politically 
superior to the masses.
22
  The ROC used their monopoly over moral values to advance 
political issues and uphold the unequal political system. After the Revolution, the ROC 
was replaced in its role in prescribing the morals of the population by other programs, 
including the Cult of Lenin.  However, after the collapse the ROC regained its power to 
dictate morals and, unsurprisingly, became one of the main objectors to Lenin’s unburied 
body.  Yet, its power may not be as strong as it once was.  Despite the ROC’s objection, 
Lenin remains in Red Square.  
While the immediately post-Soviet Church and government were somewhat 
separate, the leadership of the Church under Patriarch Kirill I and the leadership of the 
government under Vladimir Putin shows that complete separation of Church and State is 
not a goal for the current Russian government, for now at least.
23
 Today, the message of 
the ROC leadership “is not so much religious as nationalist in content, because the 
missionary rhetoric focuses mainly on ‘Holy Rus,’ on the values of ‘Russian civilization, 
rather than on the message of Christ.’”24 Patriarch Kirill expanded upon this idea in the 
“Address at the Grand Opening of the Third Assembly of the Russian World,” when he 
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stressed that the ROC played a role in creating a spiritual unity among Slavic Orthodox 
Christians, such as Ukrainians and Belarusians, by reminding them of their common 
heritage. In his twenty-five minute speech, the Patriarch mentioned God three times while 
mentioning the phrase “Russian world” thirty-eight.25  At another address Kirill:  
underscore[ed] the importance of the Orthodox Church in ensuring a patriotic 
education infused with reverential memory for Russia’s past glories.  Though he 
refers in passing to individual salvation, the emphasis here is clearly on the role 
that the [ROC] can play in strengthening the post-Soviet Russian state.  Here 
Patriarch Kirill functions almost explicitly as a political, rather than religious, 
authority figure.
26
   
Even outspoken critics of the ROC admit that there are some areas in which church and 
state need to work together to further Russia’s interests.  Andrei Sebentsov, the executive 
secretary of the Government Commission for Religious Associations, has criticized the 
Church for overstepping the church-state boundary and the State for granting the Church 
“privileges that contradict Russia’s secular constitution.”27  Yet, even he believes that 
church and state should work together when doing things like strengthening Russia’s 
position abroad.
28
  One of the alleged transgressions of the church-state boundary is a 
course on “Orthodox Culture” in Russian schools  In the article “Orthodox Bolshevism,” 
Mikhail cautions that the legalization of this course “may lead to a new totalitarianism 
where politicized Orthodoxy replaces communism as the compulsory state ideology.”29 
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The statements from Kirill and the Church’s actions show that they are a force in 
Russian politics today.  One of the specific goals of the Church is to increase Russian 
nationalism, even among non-Russian Slavs.  It is clear that the Church is using its 
influence to help cement the leadership of Vladimir Putin and spread Russian 
nationalism.  Pussy Riot’s “punk prayer” against Putin in the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior highlighted that in Russia today a stance against the church also encompasses a 
stance against the state.    
This connection between Church and State becomes highly important when 
looking at the body of Lenin.  The ROC’s stance on burials (and even on Lenin) is 
important and politicized due to this connection.  However, the fact that Lenin’s body 
remains entombed in Red Square points to the State being in control of their interactions.    
In Gill’s article, he points to many people favoring the burial of Lenin as the right 
thing to do.
30
  This is partly due to religious belief but also due to Lenin’s entombment 
violating some key traditional Russian beliefs on burials.  In both a religious and a 
traditional burial, the body must be placed in the ground.  In fact, there was a common 
belief that not burying people properly—not placing them in the ground, denying rites 
and denying a burial ceremony—would lead to calamity.31 Moreover, the ROC takes a 
strong stance on what constitutes a proper burial.  The Church states that, upon death, 
every person should be interred with specific rites.  An improper burial is connected to 
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“things not being quite right in the cosmos.”32  This indicates that burying people not 
only has a crucial place in Russian culture, but it is an important ritual to perform to keep 
social order.  Thus, Lenin’s body being in Red Square can be seen as a perversion.   
The question of whether to remove Lenin’s body from its mausoleum was 
actually first publicly raised in during the perestroika era and has been brought up again 
and again during times of contested polity.  In 1989, the host of the current affairs 
program Vzglyad, Mark Zakharov, spoke out in favor of burying Lenin.  He claimed it 
would be an act of Christian decency and human kindness, as well as being what Lenin’s 
wife wanted.  At the First Congress of People’s Deputies, also in 1989, Yurii Karyakin 
proposed burying Lenin as well, citing Lenin’s own wishes.  This is an early indicator 
that people’s desire to bury Lenin was based on a feeling that it would be a correct or 
proper action, a “moral” act.  Thus, these early discussions of burying Lenin bring up 
many points that continue to reappear since; that Lenin’s burial would fulfill his family’s 
wishes and that burying Lenin is the right thing to do.  These early and repeated 
explanations for burying Lenin highlight a desire to remove him from his place of glory, 
not because Lenin is no longer respected but, perhaps, because now Lenin’s wishes and 
needs can finally be placed above the wishes and needs of the people.  There is also a 
focus on it not being proper for Lenin to remain on display, that it would be a moral or 
even Christian act to bury him.  This can be read as a sign of respect.  Other discredited 
leaders normally are not afforded a “proper” burial; just in this thesis, Nagy was buried 
with former zoo animals in an unmarked corner on the cemetery and the Romanovs were 
similarly left in an unmarked grave – this time in the forests around Yekaterinburg.  The 
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closest analogy to Lenin would be Stalin’s removal from the mausoleum his body shared 
with Lenin during destalinization, as while Stalin was removed from his position of 
glory, he was buried in the Kremlin wall where other Soviet leaders and heroes were 
buried.  
However, Zakharov, Karyakin, and others who argued for the burial of Lenin 
were anomalies in the late 1980’s.  Karyakin’s proposal was rejected and seen as an 
attempt to remove Lenin’s image and memory from the popular consciousness.  Those 
against Lenin’s burial in a cemetery had another point- that Lenin was actually already 
buried as his body was placed the appropriate amount below ground in the mausoleum.
33
  
This is an interesting point and one that will continued to be used by those advocating 
that Lenin should remain in his mausoleum.   
The debate over what should happen with Lenin’s remains has become a battle 
over what constitutes a “proper” burial and who has the right to preside over burial rites; 
whether the Church or the State control how bodies are put to rest.  Lenin is below 
ground, he had a funeral, yet he is considered “unburied” because he was not buried in a 
traditional Russian manner.  This could be why so many people advocating Lenin’s 
reburial emphasize burying him next to his family in Volkovskoe Cemetery in St 
Petersburg, as supposedly he desired; it is a way for those of a less religious mind to 
voice their feeling that how Lenin is displayed is not right somehow.  They, therefore, 
appeal to emotion and the idea that following the wishes of the deceased is only the right 
course of action to take.  For those who are religious, it is easier to explain why Lenin 
should be removed.  For them, Lenin never received a proper Orthodox burial, and by 
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being on display, his body is subverting not only Orthodoxy but also Russian nature 
itself.  It is a constant reminder of the Soviet past, a time in which things were not quite 
right, certainly for the Orthodox Church as well as many of those outside it.  This is 
especially true considering that the continued preservation of Lenin’s body is supposed to 
represent the continued success of Communism.  So, Lenin’s “unburial” is partly so 
contentious because it highlights the tensions that come from the actual act of burying 
someone.  How someone is buried is a highly personal and political act.  Lenin being 
“unburied” causes discomfort, even among those who are nonreligious.  They rely on the 
idea of what the dead wanted to try and put to rest both Lenin’s body and their unease.      
By not decaying, Lenin’s body distorts one of the tenets of Orthodoxy.  The 
Church used to exhume bodies and if the body was found to be preserved, it was a sign of 
sainthood.  Verdery states that from a “religious point of view, then, one can see Lenin’s 
mummy should be buried, lest bad things happen, and at the same time that it should not 
be buried but be exposed under glass, as befits a saint.”34   Lenin’s perfectly preserved 
body is, according to Orthodox traditions, holy.  The saintliness of Lenin is probably not 
in debate in religious circles due to the scientific nature of his preservation.  However, the 
very fact that the body of a non-saint––to say nothing of Lenin’s role in exiling the 
Orthodox Church from power––remains preserved under glass, in such an prominent 
posistion is an affront to the Church.  In 2005, then-Metropolitan Kirill voiced these 
concerns saying that not only should Lenin be removed from his mausoleum but also he 
should be buried on church grounds.  One of the reasons stated for this move is that “the 
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idea of mummification is outside any cultural and religious context in Russia.”35  Burying 
Lenin would seem to be an important goal for the Church.  Not only can they right the 
wrong caused by an improper burial, but they can also remove a parody of a saint from 
his tomb and place him in sacred ground, allowing Lenin to be morally right in the 
afterlife in a way he never managed in actual life.  Given that the Church and State are so 
entwined why has not Lenin been buried in a cemetery yet, if only to please the ROC?        
It was not for lack of trying.  After the attempted coup of 1991, the issue of 
Lenin’s body was again broached when then St Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak 
proposed fulfilling Lenin’s “last wish” by burying him in Volkovskoe Cemetery in St 
Petersburg next to his mother and sister.  At the 1991 Congress of USSR People's 
Deputies, Sobchak proposed that the deputies: 
Предлагаю достойно завершить нашу работу, приняв следующее 
решение: выполнить последнюю волю Владимира Ильича Ульянова 
Ленина, захоронив его в соответствии с религиозными и 
национальными обычаями нашего народа и в соответствии с его 
завещанием со всеми подобающими почестями на Волковом 
кладбище в Ленинграде. 
 
Fulfill the last wish of Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) by burying him in 
accordance with the religious and national traditions of [the Russian] 
people and in accordance with his will with all proper honors in the 
Volkovskoe Cemetery in Leningrad.
36
   
Yet again there was opposition. Communists said that Lenin should not be moved 
because “the initiative to preserve Lenin’s body had come from the people.”37  This 
invokes the same imagery as Stalin did when he first proposed that Lenin be mummified 
                                                 
35
 “Call for the Reburial of Lenin,” Times (London, England), November 19, 2005. 
  
36
 Andrei Zolotov, “Minus leninizatsiya vcei strany,” Izvestiia (Moscow, Russia), September 16, 1991. 
 
37
 Gill, 178. 
     43 
and displayed, that it is the will of the people that Lenin’s body remains eternal.  Those 
against burial also pointed out that there was no documentary evidence that Lenin wished 
to be buried next to his mother.  Another argument against burial was that the removal of 
Lenin’s body from Red Square would “lead to the destruction of that ‘great architectural 
monument’ the mausoleum and that the grave in St Petersburg would be a place of 
mockery for the remains of Lenin.”38  For the Communists, Lenin deserves to be treated 
with the utmost respect.  Not only is it necessary for the country that his body remains 
displayed but it would pervert the natural order if he was moved, in what for them would 
be considered a reburial.    
Later in 1991, an article in Pravda declared that Lenin’s body was actually at the 
precise depth at which people are buried in more traditional circumstances, implying for 
all intents and purposes, that Lenin was already buried and therefore his body need not be 
removed from the mausoleum.  Additionally, the article claimed that then-President 
Yeltsin was against removing Lenin’s body from the mausoleum, which, while later 
proved untrue, added legitimacy to their underlying argument which is that Lenin does 
not need to be moved because he is already buried.  This argument echoes that voiced at 
the First Congress of People’s Deputies mentioned earlier.  It is an interesting argument 
because, in theory, it should stop people feeling uncomfortable over Lenin’s body being 
“unburied,” because in their view, it is.      
The 1993 Constitutional Crisis between Yeltsin and the legislature again sparked 
a debate about the placement of Lenin’s body.  Some anti-communists publicly pressed 
                                                 
38
 Ibid. 
 
     44 
for the removal of Lenin’s body from its mausoleum and for it to be buried in St 
Petersburg.  Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov and Patriarch Aleksei II wrote a letter to 
Yeltsin calling on the president to bury Lenin’s remains in the earth as was the traditional 
form of burial in Russia.  It was rumored that a presidential decree was being drafted to 
give effect to this; however it was decided to let the matter go to the Federal Assembly, 
who did nothing.  In 1993, Yeltsin did manage to cut off government funding for the 
mausoleum.  Also in 1993, The Synod of the ROC publicly supported Lenin’s removal 
and burial but did not commit itself to performing the ceremony.
39
 
In 1997, Yeltsin himself called for the burial of Lenin and once against the 
Communists opposed this move.  They continued to claim that there was no evidence that 
Lenin wanted to be buried near his family and the Russian people opposed moving the 
body.  Additionally, the Communists claimed that a move would be “unlawful because he 
was placed in the mausoleum by decision of the sovereign Second Congress of Soviets” 
and that even beyond that the mausoleum is protected by UNESCO.
 40
  Despite this 
rebuff from the Communists, Yeltsin declared that a national referendum should be taken 
to see if people wanted Lenin buried in a Christian way.  However, there was pushback 
against that idea also so the referendum did not occur.
41
  After the attempt at impeaching 
Yeltsin in 1999, the issue of Lenin’s body was raised again.  Patriarch Aleksei wanted all 
of the leaders buried on Red Square moved while Yeltsin actually stated that Lenin was 
to be buried, the question was just when it would happen.  His reasoning was that it is not 
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Christian or even human to leave a body on display.  In the same year, an opposition 
leader said that he would approve Vladimir Putin for prime minister only if Lenin’s body 
was removed from Red Square.
42
  
 Thus, it is clear that the burial of Lenin faced much contention in the nineties.  
Yeltsin and the ROC wanted Lenin to be buried; either to fulfill “Christian” duty or 
Russian tradition by burying the body in consecrated ground.  Yet, the Communists 
wanted to keep him properly buried, on display, on Red Square.  This debate over 
Lenin’s body clearly shows larger tension within Russia, flaring up in times of contested 
polity such as the 1993 Constitutional Crisis.  As Boris Nemtsov said in 1998, “I have a 
mystical kind of feeling that as long as we do not bury Lenin, Russia is under an evil 
spell.”43  This feeling clearly shows that Nemtsov feels Lenin’s connection to political 
events, long after his death.  Despite the strong desire of the president, high-ranking 
members of the government, and the ROC, Lenin was not buried.  Even after his body 
was used explicitly as political currency – bury Lenin and we will support Putin44 – 
Lenin’s body remained unburied, hinting to a weakness in leadership in the nineties.  As 
the removal of Stalin’s body from its place next to Lenin clearly shows, reburial can 
happen in Russia in a political context when a political ideology has fallen out of favor.  
So, it appears Lenin and his ideology were not enough out of favor to be buried easily 
and Yeltsin did not have enough power to bury Lenin unilaterally. 
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The Church’s investment in Lenin’s burial is important because, as mentioned 
above, the current Russian government and the Orthodox Church are highly connected, 
and the lines between political and moral blur.  Additionally, the state is still stronger 
than the church, despite the weaken government of the nineties and the connection 
between church and state.  While both Yeltsin and the ROC held the same view of 
Lenin’s body, current Russian President Vladimir Putin stance on Lenin’s removal from 
Red Square differs from current ROC leadership, despite them being close in many other 
realms. Putin actions and statements show that he believes that Lenin needs to be left in 
Red Square for a sense of history and stability.  Gill wrote about one of Putin’s earliest 
statements as President in July of 2001:   
many people saw their lives as being linked with Lenin’s name…that burying him 
would mean that ‘they had devoted themselves to false values and false 
objectives, that they had lived their lives in vain’.  He was therefore against 
burying Lenin because this would disrupt the social consensus and stability that 
had been achieved in the recent past.
45
 
Putin’s stance is clearly different from both his predecessor and the ROC.  He sees the 
political value in Lenin’s body.  This statement echoes back to Lenin’s body being used 
by the Soviet government in cultural management; he is trading in on people’s previous 
association of Lenin with a stable government.  It can almost be seen disavowing 
Yeltsin’s government, not just the attempt to bury Lenin.  This statement implies that 
Putin, unlike Yeltsin, is more concerned with stability than ideology.  For Putin it is 
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proper that Lenin’s body remain in Red Square, as it continues to hold what he perceives 
as the need of the people for stability over the need for a personal burial.
46
   
Despite Putin’s stance on the matter, public appeals for Lenin’s removal 
continued during the early years of the new millennium.  Some reasons given were the 
same as those previously mentioned, such as it was Lenin’s wish to be buried, Christian 
tradition, and that it would be morally right.  However some focused more on the 
political issues.  One official said that Lenin’s body being in Red Square, next to the 
Kremlin, was uncomfortable due to Lenin being responsible for the Soviet era.  Another 
called for Lenin’s removal but emphasized that it would have to happen in a sensitive 
way as not to offend Lenin’s supporters and it should not be an event which is politically 
motivated.
47
   The strongest statement against Lenin and his mausoleum came in 2006 
from the Institute of Russian History.  It released a report which criticized Lenin “for 
leading the country into social, economic and spiritual impasse, hampering its 
development and isolating it from the civilised world.”  The report further stated that “the 
state should not use taxpayers’ money on the upkeep, surveillance and restoration of the 
body, and that the body should be buried and the mausoleum demolished.”48  These 
objections show the division in thoughts about Lenin’s legacy and his proper burial.  The 
Institute of History has made an official statement that Lenin should no longer be 
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honored due to his role in hampering Russia’s development.  This contrasts with the 
information from Gill in which people seem to want to honor Lenin’s past contributions 
to Russia while ensuring that he is no longer an active part of history by removing him 
from Red Square and the Kremlin both physically and metaphorically.     
None of these objections swayed Putin who, in December 2012, said that a 
proposal to bury Lenin “is not on the agenda.”49  In another statement made at the same 
time, Putin said “[m]any are saying that having Lenin’s Mausoleum runs counter to the 
tradition. But what runs counter to tradition?... Just go to Kiev Pechersk Lavra or check 
out Pskov Monastery or Mount Athos. You’ll see the relics of saints there.”50  This is an 
highly important statement.  As outlined above, Christianity and the ROC have gained a 
stronghold in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, especially under Putin’s regime.  
However, he is equating Lenin with a saint—this subverts the Orthodox stance on 
Lenin’s body.  In both this statement and his statement in 2001, Putin clearly shows that 
he views Lenin’s contribution to Russia’s past in a positive way and wants to continue to 
the same tradition.  
It can be argued that for Putin, Lenin’s body being in Red Square is a proper 
burial.  The display of Lenin’s body allows for worshippers to gaze upon him like they 
would gaze upon holy relics.  Putin indicates that Lenin deserves to be exalted and 
glorified for his achievements.  Lenin’s body and mausoleum represent a long tradition of 
displaying power and history in Russia and also stability for Putin and, at the moment, it 
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is more advantageous for him to trade on that rather than attempt to disturb the status 
quo.  Unless something drastic happens, Putin does not have a reason to remove Lenin’s 
body.  He is trading on Lenin’s body’s political power and legitimacy in a way that 
would be impossible if Lenin were to be buried.  Thus, Lenin’s body continues to be used 
as political capital in the post-Soviet period.     
However, as briefly mentioned, not all Russian political figures feel the same 
way.  Despite a 2005 statement claiming it was not the time to bury Lenin, former Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev was quoted on June 5, 2008—the same day he called for the 
creation of a museum and memorial to honor victims of Soviet repression—that the time 
to bury Lenin has come.
51
  Gorbachev said “[Russia] should not do the grave-digging job 
right now, but we should certainly acknowledge that the mausoleum has lost its 
importance and that [Lenin] must be buried,” acknowledging that Lenin’s mausoleum 
and Lenin’s body are tied to Lenin’s importance.52  Former President Boris Yeltsin also 
changed his mind, stating in 1993 and 1997 that Lenin should be buried.
53
  It is 
interesting to note that Gorbachev spoke in June of 2008, one month after Vladimir Putin 
and Dmitri Medvedev switched places at the helm of the Russian government and that 
Yeltsin spoke after the 1993 constitutional crisis and again following his 1996 re-
election.  This timeline corresponds to Verdery’s theory that reburials are an indication of 
struggles over which form the government should take.  By voicing support for Lenin’s 
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burial, Gorbachev and Yeltsin are attempting to gain political legitimacy by distancing 
themselves, and by extension the country, from communism and the Soviet past.  By 
taking this stance at crucial moments in Russia’s political growth, they are indicating a 
transition in power, from the Soviet past represented by Lenin to the Russian future 
represented by democratic processes (no matter how removed from democracy some 
might view them).  And this seems to be the main difference between them and Putin.  
Putin does not need to distance himself from Communism and the Soviet Union in the 
same way Gorbechev and Yeltsin do.  For better or worse, they are tied to Communism, 
the Soviet government, and its failings.  Their power came primarily from the old order, 
so in order to recreate themselves and survive they cannot be seen as Communists in any 
way.  Putin, on the other hand, can embrace the more palatable aspects of the Soviet past 
to promote stability, even if that requires him placing Lenin’s body on the same level as a 
saint’s relics.   Putin is accepting Lenin’s role as both a historical figure and a key part of 
Soviet culture, which partially accounts for why he remains unburied.  While the 
wrapping maybe different than the Soviet Cult of Lenin, Putin’s statements illustrate that 
the message is the same, a strong central government is the only way forward for Russia 
and in order to build this government Putin utilizes some of the same tools as the Soviets 
as well.    
Putin has been a powerful influence in the Russian government for the last 
thirteen years and one of the biggest driving forces towards moral nationalism.  Hours 
before Yeltsin stepped down from his position and made Putin president, Putin 
“published a document on the Internet that acquired the status of his first rudimentary 
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political program and his vision for Russia.” 54   In the document, while stating that 
Russia should not have a new mandatory ideology, there was a concern that it would be 
“impossible to carry out the fruitful and edifying work that our Fatherland so sorely 
needs” while the social forces in Russia “adhered to ‘different basic values and 
fundamental ideological principles.’”  Putin further claims that “To the Russian, a strong 
state is not an anomaly… a strong state is a source and guarantor of order.  It is the 
initiator and main driving force of all transformations.”55  In order to build a Russian 
identity that was both voluntary and shared, Putin decided to build “on the aims and 
values that the vast majority of Russia’s citizens already adhere to and find attractive.”56  
This is a strikingly different tone from Yeltsin’s speech on June 22, 1998.  While Yeltsin 
was against “a firm hand and the discipline of the stick,” Putin’s style of governing is one 
that believes Russia needs a strong government in order to survive and thrive.  The whole 
idea of creating a new Russian identity requires political power and legitimacy and 
agreement—or, at least, the appearance of agreement—among the Russian populace.   
This is where Lenin’s body comes in.  At the moment, Lenin can be seen as 
symbol of Communism and Soviet ideology due in part to the large role his body played 
in Soviet doctrine.  While the connection between Soviet ideology and Lenin’s remains 
proved to be uncomfortable for Yeltsin and Gorbachev due to their own roles in the 
Soviet system, Putin can use Lenin to build a different kind of ideology of Russia, one 
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based on the continuity of power.  In fact, even the one of most controversial former 
leaders, Joseph Stalin, enjoys great popularity in Russia today.  A study released by the 
Carnegie Institute in early 2013, showed that Stalin has actually gained popularity since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, and that there is a correlation between Stalin’s resurgence 
popularity and Putin being President.
57
  It seems, then, that a close association with the 
Soviet era does not delegitimize one today, at least in the case of Putin, as much as it did 
in the nineties.   
In fact, for Putin it would be more trouble than it is worth to bury Lenin’s body.  
For Yeltsin, Lenin’s burial would have allowed him to bury an uncomfortable Soviet 
past.  Putin only gains from Lenin still being on display as Lenin’s body does not 
delegitimize him and can be used for political capital.  That seems to be the main reason 
Lenin’s remains are still on display on Red Square.  If Lenin was to be buried, then it 
would bring the issue to the forefront.  This could cause several issues such as a 
resurgence in the Communist Party as their idol is buried.  Putin can wait to bury Lenin 
until such a time that it would be more politically expedient to do so.
58
  
 As is clearly shown throughout this chapter, Lenin’s body continues to be 
important political capital in the twenty-first century.  Those connected to Soviet power 
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had a pressing reason to bury Lenin: they wished to bury their own past.  The ROC also 
wished to bury Lenin, not because of their own past, but because he can be seen as the 
perverse saint of Communism.  However, not everyone wishes to see Lenin’s body 
buried.  For the RFCP and Putin, Lenin’s body is most useful in Red Square and 
continues to be so for the foreseeable future. 
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4. Conclusions 
When looking at the recent history of Russia it is clear that, through reburials and 
unburials, the past has been used in an attempt to legitimate present power.  In the cases 
of the last leader of the tsarist regime and the first leader of the Bolshevik era, burial or 
unburial serves an important symbolic, cultural, and political function.  This thesis has 
argued that these particular ghosts of Russia’s past, have served as sites of political and 
cultural legitimacy in the time of transition from the Soviet era into the new millennium.  
The last Tsar and his family were remade into martyrs by the ROC and innocent victims 
of the Bolshevik oppression, furthering the agenda of both the ROC and the Kremlin.  By 
reburying them separately from the other tsars, they have forever been marked as distinct, 
different from their forebears.  Additionally, by using their funeral as a time to mourn 
Soviet victims, the government and the ROC controlled the language and imagery of 
reconciliation.  The ROC was able to re-establish some of their pre-Soviet control as 
Yeltsin attempted distance himself from the Soviet past, in which he himself had 
participated.   
However, in order for this remaking to be entirely successful, Lenin would have 
also needed to be remade into the killer of the Romanovs as for them to be victims of the 
Soviet regime, the symbol of that regime must be publicly blamed.  Yet, he was not and 
he is still displayed next to the seat of Russian political power.  Thus, Lenin’s remains are 
still a symbol of power in Russia.  In fact, in recent years, Putin has imbued them with 
more power, practically making them into a holy relic.  Lenin is now, in a way, the patron 
saint of Russian power, a symbol and a legacy, connecting Putin to his strong government 
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predecessors who helped make Russia a world power.  And the Russian government 
today is viewed as stable and strong, both by Russians and other governments.  Whether 
Putin actually helped create stability or not is not the question; he is seen to be the driving 
force behind the new Russia, and that is what is important.  His manipulation of Lenin’s 
remains, changing them from a symbol of the past that needs to be buried into a symbol 
of the future that needs to be exulted, shows Putin’s cunning and skill in regards to using 
symbols to create and legitimate power.  This is a skill Yeltsin lacked; while he used 
tsarist symbols in an attempt to build legitimacy and power, Yeltsin did not manage to be 
viewed as a stabilizing force in Russia.  The ROC gained the most political capital and 
legitimacy in the reburial of the Romanovs, not Yeltsin.  This can be seen through the 
populace doubting the authenticity of the remains because the Church did, rather than 
trusting the government that the remains were authentic.   
Even though he was President and had the support of the ROC, Yeltsin did not 
have enough political capital to bury Lenin’s body.  Yeltsin was less masterful at using 
symbols to legitimate government and create political currency than Putin.   That lack 
was not what caused the tumultuous nineties.  However, it is another point in history to 
examine to see exactly what happened in the nineties to cause such instability and lack of 
government legitimacy.  Yeltsin’s inability to utilize Lenin’s body in such a way is a 
symptom of the larger problem Yeltsin’s government had and an indicator of how Putin’s 
government retains control. 
This thesis shows Yeltsin’s weakness at creating a new national narrative, by 
failing to convert the symbolic power of the Romanovs’ bodies into political currency 
and also by not having Lenin buried.  Instead, the ROC was able to use the Romanovs’ 
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bodies to help advance their own narrative and increase their own legitimacy.  While the 
ROC gained power and became more legitimized after the reburial of the Romanovs, they 
still lacked the power to bury Lenin.  The only person with enough power to bury Lenin’s 
body in Russia today is Vladimir Putin and he has little reason to do that.  While surveys 
show that most Russian want Lenin’s body buried, Putin’s own words indicate that Lenin 
still serves an important symbolic function in Russia.   
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